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ARTICLES
THE ILLUSION OF FISCAL ILLUSION
IN REGULATORY TAKINGS
BETHANY R. BERGER*
The main economic justification for compensating owners for losses from
land use restrictions is based on a surprising mistake. Compensation is said
to make governments internalize the costs of their actions and therefore enact
more efficient regulations. Without compensation, the argument goes,
governments operate under a fiscal illusion because, from their perspective,
their actions are costless. The problem is that this argument makes no sense as
a description of the actual costs to governments.
Taxation is the main way governments get revenue, and most taxes depend
on the value of property and its permissible uses. If a government restricts
land use so as to reduce the value of a parcel or the income produced by it, its
residents, or its patrons, tax revenues should go down. If, however, the
restriction creates benefits, tax revenues should go up. While there are
limitations to the accuracy and efficacy of the tax revenue signal, efficient
regulations should have a net positive effect on governmental revenues, while
inefficient ones should have a net negative effect. Fully compensating owners,
in contrast, does not lead the government to accurately internalize societal
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costs—it rather adds a new and much larger cost. Because this cost usually
far exceeds revenue gains, governments may rationally forgo even efficient
regulations. Owner compensation, in other words, does not correct fiscal
illusion, it creates it.
Revealing the illusion of fiscal illusion leaves standing much older
arguments that compensation is required as a matter of fairness. But clearing
away the main efficiency justification for one-to-one compensation permits
clearer-eyed assessment of whether and to what extent fairness may require
compensation and reveals that compensation measures in the name of
efficiency may, in fact, undermine it.
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INTRODUCTION
For the first time in decades, the constitutional standard for
requiring compensation for land use restrictions that leave title in the
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original owner may be facing revision. In the last half century, the
United States Supreme Court has affirmed a regulatory takings claim
only once, in a 1992 case where the courts below found the restriction
rendered the property at issue “valueless.”1 In January 2016, however,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Murr v. Wisconsin,2 the first
regulatory takings case to be decided by the Roberts Court.3
Because regulatory takings doctrine has little direct support in
constitutional text or history, and earlier cases mostly rule against
regulatory takings, the push to expand regulatory takings often rests
on policy arguments.4 This Article argues that the central efficiency

1. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992). The regulation
there prohibited any building at all on the owner’s two beachfront lots for erosion
control purposes, although all the neighboring lots already had homes on them. Id. at
1007–08. Even there the Court remanded to determine whether the economic wipeout was permitted under “background principles of nuisance and property law.” Id. at
1031–32. Although the South Carolina Supreme Court found no such background
principle on remand in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C.
1992), other state courts have exploited the loophole. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus
Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings
Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 321, 323 (2005) (examining the use of
background principles as categorical defenses to takings claims).
2. 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016), granting cert. in Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014
WL 7271581 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014) (per curiam). In the case below, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that a restriction on building on one of two
neighboring lots owned by the same owners was not a per se taking of the owner’s
property). Murr, 2014 WL 7271581, at *8.
3. Several Roberts Court decisions have expanded the potential for takings
claims when governments acquire or claim ownership of property. See Horne v.
Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) (finding a taking in federal demand for
personal property); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586,
2599, 2603 (2013) (holding that demands for money in exchange for a permit must
be considered under the exactions analysis); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 715 (plurality opinion) (2010) (opining that
a legislative or judicial disposition transferring land ownership could be considered a
taking). These decisions might be applied to future regulatory takings cases. The
last case to directly consider a regulatory takings claim, however, was Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., decided on the eve of Roberts’ ascension to the Court. 544 U.S. 528
(2005), abrogating Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The Court in Lingle
unanimously narrowed the grounds for finding a regulatory taking, overruling a
previous suggestion that regulatory restrictions must “substantially advance” their
stated purpose. Id. at 531, 548.
4. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 783 (1995) (arguing that the original
understanding of just compensation did not include regulatory takings).
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argument for expansion—often dubbed “fiscal illusion”5—is without
foundation. Understanding the illusion at the heart of fiscal illusion
arguments for compensation places a sharper focus on the other
arguments for and against broader compensation requirements.
The efficiency argument goes like this. If governments need not
compensate owners for the loss in value caused by restricting land
use, they need not internalize the costs of their actions.6 As a result,
governments will enact inefficient restrictions because they
experience only the benefits of the land use restrictions.7
Governments operate under a fiscal illusion, in other words,
because—from their perspective—their actions are costless.
The argument seems at first glance a common-sense extension of
the cost-internalization argument often applied in analyses of private
uses of land.8 But it ignores fundamental differences with respect to
governmental income streams that make the cost-internalization
argument inapplicable. In fact, the assertion of fiscal illusion in
regulatory restrictions is itself based on the illusion that governments
do not already experience the costs of reductions in property value.
Governmental revenue is intimately tied to property value—quite
directly for property taxes, and indirectly for most sales and income
taxes.9 Governments thus already feel the costs of actions that reduce
the value or productivity of property but leave title in the hands of
the owner. These costs will be balanced against any economic
benefits the action creates in the jurisdiction, whether by increasing
tax revenue or decreasing the costs of taxpayer-funded services
associated with the property. Directly compensating owners for losses
due to use restrictions, in contrast, will not lead the government to
accurately internalize this loss. Rather, it will add a new and much
larger cost to the action. If this additional cost is greater than the
expected benefits of the land use measure, the government will
5. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 572–73, 621 (1984) (discussing “fiscal
illusion” in takings).
6. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 186–87 (5th ed. 2009).
7. Id.
8. Nuisance laws, for example, are justified in part by the need to ensure that
parties whose land uses impinge on each other’s take into account the social costs
they create, so that the resulting combination of land uses maximizes the overall
benefits from the use. See id. at 180–81; see also Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257
N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970) (reasoning that the risk of permanent damages would
“be a reasonable[,] effective spur to research for improved techniques to minimize
nuisance”).
9. See discussion infra Part II.

BERGER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE ILLUSION OF FISCAL ILLUSION

10/31/2016 8:09 PM

5

rationally decide to forgo the measure, even though the sum of the
costs and benefits to the community would be positive. Requiring
owner compensation does not correct the assumed fiscal illusion. It
simply creates a new one.
The surprising mistake at the heart of many arguments about
takings is the result of a broader phenomenon. As others have noted,
law and economics scholarship too often analyzes problems as
isolated transactions between parties, overlooking both the
interdependence of multiple actors and the importance of their
social and legal context.10 In this case, by treating land use
restrictions as bilateral transactions in which some property owners
lose and others (or perhaps governments themselves) win, scholars
have ignored the tax structure that results in governments
experiencing these losses as well.
There are, of course, limitations to the accuracy and impact of the
tax cost signal.11
The myriad qualifications, exceptions, and
deductions in the tax system mean that there will almost never be a
one-to-one correspondence between the tax received and the
underlying value taxed. Nevertheless, the goal of the system is to
achieve this correspondence, regardless of the extent to which the
system actually realizes this goal. Practically, moreover, there is a
rough relationship between tax returns and fluctuations in
underlying value taxed, something lacking with respect to direct
compensation to owners for claimed losses.
In addition, different levels of government will feel the impact of
loss in property value more or less keenly.12 Local governments,
which rely heavily on property taxes, will be most sensitive to land use
restrictions that reduce the assessed value of the property; state
governments will be less sensitive; and federal governments, even less.
While state and federal governments will be more sensitive to effects
on sales and income taxes, the relationship between land use
regulation and such taxes is less readily calculated. Similarly,
expenses associated with property use—such as funding costs of

10. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry:
Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 77–78 (2004)
(“[L]aw and economics scholars see victims in pollution disputes as acting
independently of each other, with no interdependencies and no sense of social
embeddedness. . . . [This] is a highly incomplete description of human behavior,
one that can be misleading in some important settings.”).
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See discussion infra Part II.
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policing, providing public education, or remediating environmental
degradation—are borne by different levels of government.13
There is also a robust debate on whether and to what extent
governments change their behavior in response to financial losses.14
Some argue that revenue generation does not motivate political
actors in the same way that it motivates private individuals or firms.15
The central currency for politicians is votes, not dollars; while
revenue losses—with resulting tax increases or service reductions—
may affect political goals, they do not necessarily do so. In addition,
the structure of government decision making often means that while
one entity may be responsible for making land use decisions, another
entity will be responsible for paying for them. But the premise of the
fiscal illusion argument is that governments and their constituents
need to feel both the costs and the benefits of governmental action in
order to make efficient decisions. The point of this Article is that
through the tax system, they already do.16
Establishing that governments already feel the costs of land use
restrictions does not mean that compensation is never necessary.
Owners may still be entitled to compensation for their losses as a
matter of fairness.17 But revealing the mistake on which many
efficiency arguments for compensation are based facilitates clear-eyed
assessments of fairness arguments for and against compensation.
Mirroring the way that, on a societal level, tax revenues may both rise
and fall as a result of land use restrictions, values of individual parcels
may be both enhanced and depressed by land use laws. Demanding
compensation when the same infrastructure restricts realization of

13. See DAVID BRUNORI, LOCAL TAX POLICY: A FEDERALIST PERSPECTIVE 46–47 (2d ed.
2007) (chronicling the stability of property tax and its use in financing public services).
14. See discussion infra Part III. Compare Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government
Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345,
345 (2000) (arguing that governments do not respond to compensation
requirements), with WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE
POLICIES 39–40 (2001) (arguing that municipal governments are sensitive to
compensation requirements).
15. Levinson, supra note 14, at 347.
16. Indeed, while some scholars challenge direct compensation as an effective
prod for inefficient regulation, there is overwhelming evidence that zoning, the
primary form of land use restriction, seeks to maximize tax revenue and limit
demands on that revenue. See, e.g., ANN O’M. BOWMAN & MICHAEL A. PAGANO, TERRA
INCOGNITA: VACANT LAND AND URBAN STRATEGIES 55–59 (2004) (describing ways
municipalities shift land use strategies to maximize different forms of tax revenue).
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
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those opportunities is sometimes, to borrow a phrase, a demand to
socialize costs but privatize benefits.
Part I of this Article outlines the takings debate, how the concept of
fiscal illusion has been employed in that debate, and how the link
between tax revenues and land value undermines the concept. Part
II provides more detail on the taxes impacted by land use regulation
and discusses limitations to the link between taxation and land value.
Part III discusses whether, and to what extent, political decision
making is actually sensitive to these revenue impacts. Part IV suggests
ways that exposing the illusion of fiscal illusion adjusts the focus on
arguments for and against compensation as a matter of fairness and
briefly shows how this analysis applies to Murr v. Wisconsin.
I. FISCAL ILLUSION ARGUMENTS AND THEIR FLAWS
Increasing efficiency is one of the core arguments for expanding
the category of “takings,” governmental impacts on property for
which compensation is required.18 The central economic justification
for compensation is that it will ensure that governments take into
account the societal costs of their actions, a phenomenon often
described as counteracting fiscal illusion. This justification is based
on the premise that governments do not already experience the
losses caused by actions that reduce property value. Because
governments already lose revenue whenever their actions reduce the
value of property or the activities associated with it, requiring direct
compensation to the owner does not mitigate fiscal illusion. Rather,
it creates new distortions that may deter efficient decision making.
This Section briefly outlines the takings debate, the role of fiscal
illusion arguments in this debate, and the fallacy of those arguments.
A. Fiscal Illusion in Takings Scholarship
Whether property has been “taken,” so as to demand
compensation, is the most palpable site of interaction between public
and private definitions of property and is a fertile battleground for
debates over the role of each. Since at least 1967, when Frank
Michelman wrote his masterful exploration of the reasons for the
compensation requirement, debates about takings have revolved
around two policy goals: fairness, or respect for the rights of those
affected by governmental action, and utility or efficiency, or

18. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
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incentives for uses of property that will maximize public welfare.19
The sweeping nature of these goals, perhaps, explains why takings
jurisprudence offers as many questions as answers. When and why
the government must pay compensation for actions that affect
property has been described as a “muddle,”20 “a secret code that only
a momentary majority of the Court is able to understand,”21 a
candidate for the “doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle
prize,”22 and “like finding shapes in the clouds,” a process that says
“more about the observer than the clouds themselves.”23
Despite this muddle, the broad contours of takings doctrine are
easy to outline. When the government takes title to property or
orders its permanent occupation by a stranger, there is almost always
a taking, and the government must pay the owner the fair market
value of the property acquired.24 Similarly, when the government
renders real property valueless, there will generally be a taking.25 But
where the government simply restricts the uses of property, even if
the restriction significantly reduces the property’s value,
compensation will very rarely be required.26

19. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214, 1219 (1967).
20. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984).
21. Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Commentary, Deterrence and Distribution in
the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 997 (1999).
22. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993).
23. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 741 (2005).
24. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982)
(holding that permanent physical occupations, no matter how small, require
compensation). The Supreme Court has recently held that this principle usually
applies to personal as well as real property. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419,
2426 (2015).
25. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031–32 (1992) (holding
that economic wipe-outs are per se compensable unless the regulations merely
implemented “background principles of nuisance and property law”).
26. William A. Fischel, Why Are Judges So Wary of Regulatory Takings?, in PRIVATE
PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE FUTURE OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 50, 55 (Harvey M.
Jacobs ed., 2004) (stating that under the Penn Central test, the “bottom line is that
the complaining property owner almost always loses”); see, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306, 319–20 (2002)
(finding no taking when temporary moratoria prevented any development of
property for more than two years); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 116–17, 138 (1978) (finding no taking in the implementation of a
landmark protection law preventing Grand Central Station from selling its air rights
for millions of dollars).
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It is this last thread of the doctrine that has come under attack as
furthering fiscal illusion. The argument goes like this: if governments
do not have to pay owners for the costs of actions that reduce the value
of property, they will act as though those actions are costless. The
result will be overregulation or restrictions on uses of property whose
net effect is to detract from public welfare. If, however, governments
compensate owners for their losses, they will internalize the costs of
their actions and make more efficient decisions.27
Although scholars made this argument in earlier articles,28
Lawrence Blume and Daniel Rubinfeld dubbed it “fiscal illusion” in
1984, and the title has stuck.29 This use of the phrase is somewhat
different from its use in the public choice literature that coined it,
where fiscal illusion primarily describes the failure of voters to
understand the cost of government services that they are already in
fact paying for through taxes or other means.30 In takings literature,
in contrast, “fiscal illusion” seems instead to mean that the
government does not take into account the societal costs of
governmental actions unless the government itself pays for them:
[A] governmental regulatory body will over- or under-regulate if it
does not consider all budgetary and social costs. The actual result
depends upon the distribution of individual tastes and political
influence within the community. As applied to the land market, if
the governmental body responsible for zoning decisions does not
pay compensation, it cannot make socially beneficial decisions. In
other words, the governmental body is subject to “fiscal

27. Throughout the literature, and in this Article as well, “efficiency” generally
refers to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, meaning that the regulation generates benefits to
society as a whole that outweigh its costs, not that the action makes all those affected
by it better off. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6, at 43–44; Jules Coleman, The
Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner’s The
Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1106–07 (1982) (book review)
(discussing Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto superiority definitions of efficiency); Thomas S.
Ulen, Commentary, Professor Crespi on Chicago, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 191, 193 (1997)
(noting that law and economics scholars have made Kaldor-Hicks the “default”
criterion for efficiency).
28. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 420 (1977) (arguing that compensation will lead municipal
officials to conduct more thorough cost-benefit analyses of alternate measures);
Michelman, supra note 19, at 1218 (arguing that compensation may provide
assurance that “society deems the measure . . . efficient”).
29. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 5, at 621.
30. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE
POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES 128–30 (1977) (arguing that voters make fiscal choices
in response to the perceived cost of public services rather than their actual costs).
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illusion.” Fiscal illusion arises because the costs of governmental
actions are generally discounted by the decisionmaking body unless
they explicitly appear as a budgetary expense.31

Whether called fiscal illusion or cost internalization, the concept is
a polestar of economic analysis of takings. The leading law and
economics textbook, for example, summarizes it as follows:
Obviously, the noncompensability of regulations gives government
officials an incentive to overregulate, whereas the compensability of
takings makes governmental officials internalize the full cost of
expropriating private property. If the state need not compensate
for restrictions, then it will impose too many of them. If there are
too many restrictions, then resources will not be put to their
highest-valued use. Thus, uncompensated restrictions result in
inefficient uses.32

Compensation, in contrast, provides a check to ensure that
governments will enact only efficient actions. Richard Epstein puts it
bluntly: “If by chance, the diffuse social gains do outweigh the
localized costs, then the ‘winners’ should be able to push the
condemnation measure through, with compensation.”33
Richard
Posner, one of the founding figures in law and economics,
summarizes the argument as follows: “The simplest economic

31. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 5, at 621 (footnotes omitted). Although
those who argue that compensation will lead to more efficient results do sometimes
argue that the efficiency-generating impact of the results stems from voter pressure,
they generally do not incorporate the public choice insight that the form—rather
than amount—of public expenditures is crucial. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485
U.S. 1, 22 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that uncompensated regulation
permits wealth transfer “to be achieved ‘off budget,’ with relative invisibility and thus
relative immunity from normal democratic processes”). In public choice literature,
however, full compensation may be consistent with fiscal illusion depending on
whether the connection between compensation and voter tax bills is sufficiently
salient. See Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey,
in TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RUSSELL MATHEWS 65, 65–
67 (Geoffrey Brennan et al. eds., 1988) (summarizing the fiscal illusion thesis).
32. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6, at 186–88. Cooter and Ulen then go on to
state moral hazard problems with across-the-board compensation. See DAVID A. DANA
& THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 41–46 (2002) (calling “fiscal illusion,”
along with fairness and process concerns, one of three central arguments for
compensation); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES! THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE
REGULATION 105 (2015) (“[T]he appeal of regulatory takings to economists is that it
makes regulators pay close attention to the economic consequences of their
actions”); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 127–29
(2004) (summarizing and critiquing the cost internalization argument).
33. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 119 (2008).
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explanation for the requirement of just compensation is that it
prevents the government from overusing the taking power.”34
Scholars have raised important qualifications of the efficiencygenerating results of compensation standing alone. In some cases,
high transaction costs undermine the efficiency benefits of
compensation.35 Compensation may also create a moral hazard by
effectively insuring those engaging in potentially harmful behavior,
leading them to invest without regard to the risk of government
prohibition.36 Further, cost internalization does not require—and is
sometimes undermined by requiring—governments to pay owners,
rather than putting the money into some other worthy fund.37
Scholars have also raised more fundamental challenges to the
efficiency argument for compensation. One such challenge is that
governmental actors are far more concerned with getting and
maintaining political power—a goal that needs not have a direct
connection with revenue going out and has an even more tenuous
connection with revenue coming in.38 Another challenge is that
measuring the impact of government actions by their monetary costs
and benefits may miss less monetizable impacts, such as the harms of
racism or pollution, the benefits of an old growth forest, or the
importance of preserving existing communities.39

34. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (4th ed. 1992).
35. See Michelman, supra note 19, at 1214–15 (discussing “settlement costs” for
paying compensation).
36. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509,
537–40 (1986).
37. See Heller & Krier, supra note 21, at 1000 (arguing that at times efficiency
would be better served if governments “pay deterrence damages into a special fund,
or even into general revenues”).
38. See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT.
279, 280 (1992) (asserting that compensation may sometimes decrease public
opposition, thereby reducing incentives for officials to enact only efficient
measures); Levinson, supra note 14, at 345 (arguing that government actors are less
responsive to financial factors than political ones); see also FISCHEL, HOMEOWNER
HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 39–40 (discussing the different political considerations
of local versus larger governments). For a recent empirical study showing that
increasing compensation requirements did not deter eminent domain in Israel, see
Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government Fiscally Blind? An
Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement on Eminent Domain
Exercises, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2621778.
39. See generally Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free
and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1035–38 (2009) (discussing
limitations of the efficiency approach).
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These arguments, however, have largely led economics-minded
authors to develop proposals tinkering with when and how much
compensation should be required rather than to discard reliance on
the concept.40 Despite decades of critique, therefore, fiscal illusion
remains “perhaps the most common economic explanation of the
constitutional mandate of just compensation.”41
B. The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Brief
Missed in all the writing on fiscal illusion in regulatory takings is
that the concept makes no sense as a description of the actual costs to
governments. Taxation is the main way governments get revenue,
and most taxes depend on the value of property and its permissible
uses. If governments restrict property use so as to reduce the value of
the property or the income produced by it, its residents, or its
patrons, they already feel the loss in their budgets. If the restriction
enhances the value of property or limits the taxpayer-funded services
associated with it, the government will experience those benefits as
well. Efficient regulations, therefore, should have a net positive effect
on governmental revenues, while inefficient ones should have a net
negative effect.
Compensation will only undermine accurate
internalization of the societal cost of regulation.
This argument has less force with regard to physical takings. When
the government physically acquires the property of another, it
actually gets the property itself. Therefore, the government has
gained an asset with an easily identifiable market value and will
roughly break even if it compensates the owner for the same
amount.42
Conversely, if the government need not pay

40. See Timothy J. Brennan & James Boyd, Political Economy and the Efficiency of
Compensation for Takings, 24 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 188, 200 (2006) (arguing that
whether compensation is paid should depend on the relative political power of
beneficiaries and land owners); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory
Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 749, 750–51 (1994)
(proposing that compensation should be owed only if the land was used efficiently
before regulation or if the government passed the regulation inefficiently); Paul
Pecorino, Optimal Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 269, 271,
274 (2011) (positing that compensation should depend in part on the distortionary
impact of taxes and the level of governmental bias).
41. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings
Compensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1682 (2010).
42. The government will only “roughly break even” because some additional
costs are not included here, such as the cost of finding the owner and setting
compensation, and the loss of tax revenue on the property. But except for very
miniscule governmental invasions—see, for example, Loretto v. Teleprompter
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compensation, it collects a windfall and may have an economic incentive
to overtake.43 Compensation thus makes more sense as a measure to
discourage inefficiency in physical takings—but those are the actions for
which compensation is already clearly required anyway.
In contrast, where the owner retains title to the property, taxation
means that the government already feels her pain. This concept is
clearest for property taxes, which are based on a property’s assessed
value. Because property is assessed at its highest and best legal use, if
a regulation prohibits its most lucrative use, then its assessed value
should decrease, which should reduce taxes from the property.44 But

Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (property occupied had almost no
value)—the value of the property itself should be so much larger that transaction
costs and lost tax revenues are relatively insignificant in the overall transaction.
43. One could make a similar argument with respect to land use restrictions.
Covenants are private agreements for land use restrictions and include some of the
same things—commercial use restrictions, single family home requirements, etc.—
included in land use laws. Why, when the government enacts such a restriction,
aren’t they acquiring the value of the equivalent private covenant? There are
practical and theoretical objections to this argument. The practical objection is that
placing a dollar value on such restrictions is far more difficult than valuing physical
property. Covenants are usually created as part of an exchange of land or as a
voluntary exchange for tax benefits, so there are few comparable market sales of such
restrictions. Indeed, recent investigations suggest donations of such restrictions are
routinely overvalued. See Josh Eagle, Notional Generosity: Explaining Charitable Donors’
High Willingness to Part with Conservation Easements, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 70 &
n.122 (2011) (arguing that tax deductions for conservation easements overvalue the
easements); Wendy C. Gerzog, Alms to the Rich: The Façade Easement Deduction, 34 VA.
TAX REV. 229, 229 (2014) (contending that the façade easement tax deduction
overvalues the easements); see also JOAN YOUNGMAN, A GOOD TAX: LEGAL AND POLICY
ISSUES FOR THE PROPERTY TAX IN THE UNITED STATES 131 (2016) (discussing the
difficulty of valuing conservation easements). The theoretical objection is that
physical property, once taken, belongs to the government in a way that a regulatory
restriction simply does not. Land, if not valuable for the use for which the
government took it, may be sold or put to another use. A land use restriction simply
cannot be repurposed in this way—if the restriction turns out not to be worth the
costs it imposes, the government’s only option is to repeal it, retaining no future
value to enjoy. Moreover, the benefit of the use is generally not experienced by the
government itself, but by owners of other property. Situations in which the
restriction is the equivalent of an easement for the government’s own use are far
more likely to be held to be takings. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36, 47 (1964) (positing that “state courts have quite uniformly rejected”
appropriations in the guise of restrictions “and required the payment of
compensation”).
44. The municipality might make up the difference by increasing the local tax
rate, but such increases would be uniform across properties, so that the yield from
the restricted property would still be proportionately lower.
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land use restrictions also affect income and sales taxes.45 If
residential purposes are restricted or the property becomes less
desirable for them, fewer or less wealthy people, who will pay lower
income taxes, will live there. If lucrative industrial or commercial
purposes are prohibited, corporate and employee income taxes will
go down. Finally, if retail purposes are restricted or become less
profitable on the property, sales taxes will drop accordingly. As
discussed in the next Section, a number of factors distort the cost
signals of these taxes and whether the same government that enacts
the land use restriction is the one that feels the restriction’s effects.
Despite this, some government always and already feels the cost of
restrictions on property.
The cost experienced by the government is, of course, not the
same as that experienced by the property owner. But neither is the
benefit. Both the cost and the benefit reflect the percentage of value
reached by taxation, and (assuming that tax rates accurately capture
value and income, an assumption discussed further below) the sum
should reflect the overall economic impact of the action on social
welfare. Requiring governments to compensate owners directly for the
loss, in contrast, adds an extraneous cost that is usually significantly
larger than, and has little to do with, the social welfare impact of the
restriction and may therefore deter otherwise efficient regulations.
Consider this extremely simplified example: assume that residents
of Anytown are taxed at 1% of the value of their properties annually,
and that a new zoning restriction lowers the fair market value of
Blackacre by 20%, from $100,000 to $80,000. The owner of
Blackacre immediately loses $20,000 in value, while the government
will only lose $200 in revenue in the first year reflecting this change.
If the zoning restriction raises the value of surrounding properties,
taxation will also only capture that value at a rate of 1% a year. Say
the zoning restriction raises the value of twenty surrounding
properties by $5000 each, for a total of $100,000, or a net gain of
$80,000 in property value. The government will recoup $1000 per
year of this benefit, for a net gain of $800. Thus, although the net
impact of the property restriction on social welfare is not the same as
the impact on governmental revenue, the coefficient will be the same
for each. An overall efficient change will have an overall positive
impact on governmental budgets, while an overall inefficient change
will have a negative impact.
45. See BOWMAN & PAGANO, supra note 16, at 55 (discussing land use strategies to
maximize particular kinds of taxes).
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Now imagine the impact if Anytown is forced, as advocates of
expansion of regulatory takings urge, to pay the owner of Blackacre
for the reduction in value to the property. In the first year after the
restriction, the government loses both the reduction in taxable value
($200) and the cost of compensation ($20,000), but only gains $1000,
for a net loss of $19,200. Although the overall benefit will still be
$800 for future years, it will be twenty-five years before the
government breaks even on this restriction, by which point the
positive impact on governmental revenue may well be wiped out by
the cost of financing the initial $20,000 compensation.
Across the range of cases, the length of time necessary for a
government to reap the benefits of an efficient restriction will
depend on multiple factors:
the tax rate, the amount of
compensation necessary, the cost of generating the initial lump sum
award to the property owner, any independent change in property
value, and the relative gains and losses from the restriction.46 But,
except in extreme cases, the governmental incentives are very
different in a regime that requires compensation for land use
restrictions. A restriction that is efficient as a matter of overall social
welfare no longer makes as much sense as a matter of governmental
revenue. A government motivated by its budget might well choose to
forgo the restriction in order to avoid paying compensation, and
property regulation would be less efficient as a result.
This hypothetical example does not take into account the
transaction costs in finding those experiencing loss as a result of the
restriction, determining the amount of the loss, and paying the
compensation. All of these additional costs will make restricting land
use with a compensation requirement an even less attractive
proposition.47 In contrast, there are no additional transaction costs
involved in taxation. Although setting and collecting taxes is costly
and cumbersome, both cost and cumber exist whether or not
compensation is required for regulatory restrictions.
C. Conclusion
Requiring compensation for regulatory restrictions does not dispel
fiscal illusion—it creates it. Fully compensating the owners whose
property loses value as a result of land use restrictions has nothing to

46. See Pecorino, supra note 40, at 274 (showing the costs of fulfilling
compensation requirements).
47. Cf. Michelman, supra note 19, at 1214–15, 1214 n.99 (discussing ways that
finding and settling claims for compensation affect a measure’s gains).
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do with accurate balancing of costs and benefits. Governments do
not receive the value that is lost by the owner directly; instead, they
receive only a fraction of that value through the amount recouped in
increased tax revenues or saved in taxpayer-funded services. But
governments also experience a decrease in revenues proportionate to
any losses property owners experience. In a nondiscriminatory and
accurate system of taxation, actions that have a positive economic
impact will increase governmental revenue while those that have a
negative impact will decrease revenue. To the extent governments
react to these revenue changes, they do not need compensation
requirements to dispel the illusion that land use restrictions are
costless. Adding a compensation requirement, in contrast, distorts
the cost signal that taxation already provides.
Will this realization make governments enact only measures that
maximize economic welfare? Not necessarily. Sadly, governmental
actors, like the rest of us, lack crystal balls foretelling which measures
will produce wealth and prosperity. All they can do is guess, and
their guesses are sometimes very bad. Also, governmental actors,
perhaps even more than the rest of us, are motivated by many things
beyond maximizing revenues.48 They may support measures that are
bad economics because they are good politics and will win votes even
if they lose money. They may also support measures that serve policy
goals without regard to their ultimate economic impact. Economic
arguments are helpful in environmental protection or affordable
housing debates, for example, but are less important in securing their
passage than other convictions. But the fiscal illusion argument is
built on the assumption that policymakers should and do care about
maximizing fiscal returns. Taken on its own terms, the argument
makes no sense.
II. THE TAX/LAND USE FEEDBACK LOOP AND ITS LIMITATIONS
Governments raise revenue in many ways, and property use affects
most of them. Property taxes are affected by the value of the
property, sales taxes by the sales connected with the property, and
income taxes by how attractive the property is for profitable
businesses and higher-income employees and residents. As legal
changes affect the importance of any one of these forms of taxation,
governments turn to others to make up lost revenue. Limits on
municipal property taxation, for example, lead local governments to

48. See discussion infra Part III.
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compete for local sales or income taxes and other fees, or to rely on
state revenues, themselves derived from sales and income taxes, to
make up shortfalls.49
Changes in property value have different impacts on different taxes
and governments. Municipal governments, which enact most land
use restrictions, are most sensitive to changes in property taxes, while
federal and state governments are most sensitive to changes in
income taxation. By contrast, state and, to a lesser extent, municipal
governments are most sensitive to changes in sales taxes. Features of
various tax systems may also distort the accuracy with which
assessment value reflects property value. Nevertheless, this section
shows that various taxes should ultimately communicate much of the
economic impact of land use restrictions to each of the jurisdictions
in which the property is located.
A. Real Property Taxes
The impact of land use restrictions has the most direct and
transparent effect on real property taxes. Real property taxes are
levied in every state and are a tremendously important source of
revenue.50 Property taxes range from over 40% of all revenue in
many northeastern states to only 11% of revenue in Alaska, which
relies heavily on mineral extraction fees and royalties.51 Property
taxes are particularly important for local governments: property
taxes make up over 70% of local tax revenue.52 Although both states
and municipalities rely more heavily on other sources of revenue
than they did before the property tax revolts of the 1970s, property
taxes remain the most significant source of tax revenue for state and
local governments.53
Property taxes are a function of the assessed value of the property
at issue, multiplied by the assessment rate, multiplied by the rate at
49. See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
50. YOUNGMAN, supra note 43, at ix (stating that “[t]he property tax is a mainstay
of independent local revenue in this country,” whose annual totals far exceed the
corporate income tax); Ryan Forster & Kail Padgitt, Where Do State and Local
Governments Get Their Tax Revenue?, 242 FISCAL FACT 1, 4–5 (2010),
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff242.pdf.
51. Id.
52. See JEFFREY L. BARNETT ET AL., 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: FINANCE—STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUMMARY REPORT 3 (2014), http://www2.census.gov/govs/l
ocal/summary_report.pdf (reporting that property taxes made up 73.5% of local tax
revenue in 2012).
53. See BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 55, 58 (discussing the decline in reliance on
property taxes).
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which the value is taxed, called the millage rate.54 Assessment is most
often conducted by municipalities, although states have varying levels
of control and involvement in assessment.55 Assessment itself is based
on the sales prices of comparable properties, replacement cost, or
income stream of the property, or some combination of the three.56
With the exception of replacement cost, each of these factors is
directly affected by restrictions on the use of the property. Indeed,
claims for takings compensation for regulatory restrictions generally
rest on either the reduced expected sales price or income stream
from the property.57
A number of factors affect the extent to which assessed value
accurately reflects the impact of land use restrictions. Some factors
are the result of various exemptions and limitations on property taxes
imposed as a result of widespread protests against property taxes in
the 1970s.58 Many of these measures draw differences between
business and residential, particularly owner-occupied, properties.59
More than half of states have homestead exemptions reducing the
taxes on properties occupied as the owner’s primary residence.60
Many other states prevent property taxes from exceeding a certain
percentage of the owner’s annual income.61 A number of other states

54. E.g., MANDY RAFOOL, A GUIDE TO PROPERTY TAXES: AN OVERVIEW 8–9 (2002).
55. Id. at 7–8 (breaking down the assessment responsibility in each state).
56. Jennifer J.S. Brooks & Ronald J. Schultz, Market Theory: An Approach to Real
Property Valuation for State and Local Tax Purposes, 45 TAX LAW. 339, 339–40 (1992).
57. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (alleging takings
based on different in value if he could fill in and develop his wetland property versus
its value with the restriction); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384
(1926) (arguing that regulation amounted to a taking because property was worth
$10,000 per acre if it could be used for industrial purposes versus $2500 per acre if
restricted to residential purposes).
58. Property taxes are extremely visible to taxpayers. Unlike most income taxes,
property taxes are not deducted from an income stream or calculated as a portion of
an overall tax bill. Rather, owners receive a separate bill for property taxes, often
twice a year. If individuals choose not to pay, governments may foreclose on their
homes. Property taxes also need not reflect ability to pay; those who own property as
a residence receive no additional income when the value of their property increases.
Particularly for those on a fixed income, increased taxes as a result of increased
assessed value impose a serious hardship. In response to such inequities and other
protests, states have enacted a number of measures that distort the relationship
between taxation and assessed value. See BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 56–58; Edward A.
Zelinsky, The Once and Future Property Tax: A Dialogue with My Younger Self, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 2199, 2201–03, 2216 (2002) (discussing changes to property tax).
59. BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 58, 63–64.
60. Id. at 63–64.
61. Id. at 64.
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grant deferrals of property taxes for elderly or disabled owners until
the property is sold, although few of those eligible take advantage of
the deferrals.62 Many states also create different assessment rates for
different kinds of properties, often taxing homeowners and farmers
on a smaller percentage of the assessed value than that on which
businesses are taxed.63
Each of these measures might be expected to make governments
less sensitive to measures that affect the assessed value of residential,
as opposed to business, properties. Nevertheless, governmental
reliance on residential property taxes has only grown since the
1970s.64 Factors behind this trend may include greater difficulty in
assessing business property, greater reliance by businesses on
equipment rather than real property, and negotiated tax reductions
for new businesses expected to contribute to economic
development.65 So although changes in value may affect the tax levy
on different kinds of property in different ways, restrictions that
affect the value of different kinds of properties will in most cases also
affect property taxes.
An additional limitation lies in the accuracy of assessed value.
Because assessments rely on the assessor’s estimate of what the
property will sell for, and because individual properties may differ in
many ways even from neighboring properties, there is much room for
error. Inconsistencies in assessed values are notorious.66 Some of
these differences are random. Others are the result of systemic
differences. Studies have found systemic undervaluation of high value
residences and overvaluation of low cost properties; lower valuation of
owner-occupied versus rental properties; and even overvaluation of
properties in majority-minority versus majority-white neighborhoods.67
If there were truly no relationship between assessed value and true
value, there would be no reason for property taxes to reflect the
impact of land use restrictions. But, of course, there is a significant
62. Id. at 64–65.
63. RAFOOL, supra note 54, at 8.
64. BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 58; see also Byron Lutz et al., The Housing Crisis and
State and Local Government Tax Revenue: Five Channels, 41 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON.
306, 308 (2011) (reporting that residential property makes up about 60% of assessed
value).
65. BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 58.
66. Id. at 57; see also Lee Harris, ‘Assessing’ Discrimination: The Influence of Race in
Residential Property Tax Assessments, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2004) (discussing
the systematic differences in property valuation across racial lines).
67. See Harris, supra note 66, at 12 (examining the racial dynamics underlying the
disparities in property tax assessments).
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relationship, even if the relationship is not perfect.68 The kind of
differences caused by land use restrictions are also relatively easy to
assess. Unlike the different feel and attractiveness from one block to
another, prohibitions on building more than one home per acre, for
example, or on industrial use, have clear and comparatively easy to
monetize impacts.69 Land use restrictions also do not fall within the
known categories of systemic overassessment, such as low value,
commercial, renter-occupied properties.70
Another potential limit on the sensitivity of governmental decision
makers to changes in property value comes from lag times between
assessments.
If property need not be reassessed regularly,
governments may enjoy long periods without experiencing revenue
changes from reductions in property value. Although eventually the
change will affect tax revenues, in the interim the situation might
appear to be closer to the something-for-nothing that advocates of
the fiscal illusion construct posit. If the cost is delayed, however, so is
the benefit; the government will not experience any tax gains from
increased value of other properties until reassessment is complete
either.71 Widespread decreases in assessment times over recent
Today, reassessment is
decades also mitigate this problem.72
mandated every year in twenty-five states; in most others,
reassessment is required between every two and four years.73 There
are outliers—Rhode Island requires reassessment every ten years;
North Carolina, every eight years; and California, under Proposition
13, requires reassessment only when property is sold.74 But in most
states owners are entitled to regular reassessments.
The availability of appeals provides another safeguard to ensure
that assessments reflect the impact of restrictions that decrease

68. See Justin M. Ross & Wenli Yan, Fiscal Illusion from Property Reassessment? An
Empirical Test of the Residual View, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 7, 9 (2013) (noting high correlation
between property tax revenues and housing prices).
69. In fact, state and local governments regularly do monetize such impacts by
reducing property taxes on land dedicated to open space, wilderness, or farming
purposes. Because such easements are only exchanged with governments or
charities, however, and not on the open market, there is concern that such
easements are overvalued. Eagle, supra note 43, at 69–70.
70. If anything, downzoning, restrictions on commercial uses, and environmental
protections are more likely in the high value, owner-occupied areas that are more
likely to be underassessed already. Harris, supra note 66, at 12.
71. RAFOOL, supra note 54, at 6.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 6–7.
74. Id.
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property value. Assessment appeals are rare—occurring in just 2% of
assessments according to one early study75—but are low cost and
readily available to the disgruntled property owner.76 For the owner
significantly aggrieved by a land use restriction, the assessment appeal
presents an easy partial remedy.
The most important limitation of the impact of land use restrictions
on property taxes is that they are primarily municipal taxes. Many
states collect taxes on particular kinds of property, such as railroad
rights-of-way;77 a number commandeer some municipal taxes to fund
school revenue equalization schemes; and a few collect and distribute
most property tax revenues directly.78 In general, however, property
taxes fund municipal budgets, not state ones, and certainly not federal
ones. Municipal governments will, therefore, be most sensitive to the
impact any land use restrictions have on property taxes, state
governments less so, and federal governments hardly at all.
But what one level of government loses, other governments and
other tax sources must make up.79 In particular, when local revenues
decrease, state support increases. The limitations on property taxes in
recent decades have been accompanied by sharply increased state
support for local governments.80 States, in turn, have increased their
reliance on other forms of revenue, particularly individual and
corporate income taxes.81 Still, property taxes compete with sales taxes

75. THEODORE REYNOLDS SMITH, REAL PROPERTY TAXATION AND THE URBAN
CENTER: A CASE STUDY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 46 (1972).
76. See RAFOOL, supra note 54, at 11 (describing the elements of the appeals
process common to most states, including that property owners generally may simply
call the assessor’s office).
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id. at 4–5.
79. See generally John Joseph Wallis, A History of the Property Tax in America, in
PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF C. LOWELL
HARRISS 123, 127–28 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001) (describing a shift between
different types and levels of taxation over U.S. history).
80. See BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 65–66 (discussing the significant increase in
state funding for local schools over the past quarter century).
81. Between 1948 and 2010, sales taxes as a percentage of state and local
revenues have remained almost the same. See Liz Malm & Ellen Kant, The Sources of
State and Local Tax Revenues, TAX FOUND. tbl.2 (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://taxfoundation.org/article/sources-state-and-local-tax-revenues (showing that
individual and corporate income taxes increased from 8.5% of state and local
revenues to 23.9% between 1948 and 2010).
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as the single largest source of state and local tax revenue82 and have
increased in importance as state sales taxes decreased in recent years.83
In short, both state and local governments will experience real
budgetary effects from land use restrictions that affect property
values. While these are not precisely proportional to or simultaneous
with those felt by property owners, they are significant enough to
undercut any false impression that the actions are costless, and
accurate enough to signal what those costs and benefits actually are.
B. Income Taxes
Land use restrictions also frequently affect income taxes. In
contrast to property taxes, federal and, to a lesser extent, state
governments will be most sensitive to these impacts. The impact of
property restrictions on income taxes is neither as direct nor as
transparent as the effect on property taxes, but is particularly clear
for the kinds of land use measures likely to be imposed by nonmunicipal governments.
Land use measures affect income taxes in many ways. Changing
the value of the property obviously changes the income produced on
sale of the property, but the effects are much more pervasive.
Restricting property to residential uses prevents the property itself
from generating income except as rental property. Increasing
minimum lot sizes generally leads to higher-income property
owners.84
Prohibiting development of a property to achieve
environmental goals may undermine almost all of its incomeproducing potential.
The impact of such measures on income taxes is more difficult to
calculate than the impact on property taxes. Income taxes, after all, are
not based on property value.85 In addition, because many local
82. Id.
83. See id. (showing property taxes outpacing sales taxes in 2010); NATIONAL
TOTALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE, BY TYPE OF TAX, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU tbl.1 (June 21, 2016) [hereinafter STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX
REVENUE], http://www2.census.gov/govs/qtax/2016/q1t1.xls (showing property
taxes were significantly larger than sales or income taxes in 2013 and 2014).
84. Fencing out low-income residents may even be the purpose of such
restrictions. See REG’L PLANNING ASS’N & LINCOLN LAND INST., FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY
TAX REFORM: LAND USE IMPLICATIONS OF NEW JERSEY’S TAX DEBATE 7–8 (2005)
[hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY TAX REFORM] (finding that municipalities use
their zoning and taxing power to restrict affordable housing).
85. The income of a wealthy person residing in a hovel, for example, will be
taxed at the same rate as that same person residing in a mansion. A fabulously
successful restaurant in a hole-in-the-wall on Manhattan’s Avenue C is taxed at the
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governments lack the ability to levy income taxes, they will generally not be
sensitive to the effects on income except as a proxy for other qualities.
Quite a number of local governments, however, particularly larger
ones, do levy a small income tax.86 All Indiana and Maryland counties,
for example; over six hundred Iowa school districts; hundreds of Ohio
school districts and cities; twenty-three Michigan cities; plus a number
of major cities, like New York, San Francisco, and Philadelphia, levy an
income tax.87 One comprehensive study shows that cities with the
ability to levy employee or corporate income taxes aggressively tailor
land use strategies to maximize such taxes, particularly because they
often fall on non-residents (and therefore non-voters).88 But these
jurisdictions still represent a minority,89 and local governments get
most of their revenue from property taxes and state transfers.
This is not to say that municipalities do not care about the income
of their residents and businesses—successful businesses and wealthy
residents generally raise property values and, with them, property taxes.
Poorer residents and those with children often require more
government services, demanding more governmental outlay.90
Therefore, municipalities often try to exclude low-income residents91
and solicit successful businesses.92 But in general, concern about
income taxes per se does not generate these desires; in fact,

same rate as an equally successful restaurant on Fifth Avenue. In fact, the effective
income tax rate for taxpayers with less valuable property might be even higher
because they will have lower deductions for mortgage interest, business expenses,
and the like.
86. Joseph Henchman, County and City Income Taxes Clustered in States with Poor
Tax Climates, TAX FOUND. (July 11, 2008), http://taxfoundation.org/article/countyand-city-income-taxes-clustered-states-poor-tax-climates.
87. Id.
88. See BOWMAN & PAGANO, supra note 16, at 70–78 (discussing land use strategies
of cities with income taxes).
89. See id. at 50 (reporting that out of 555 cities with populations over 50,000,
only 8% had the ability to levy an income tax).
90. See FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra note 84, at 8 (reporting that
over half of New Jersey’s expenditures are on educating school-age children).
91. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713,
718 (N.J. 1975) (noting the municipality’s concession that “its land use regulation
was intended to result and has resulted in economic discrimination and exclusion”
and argument that “its policies and practices are in the best present and future fiscal
interest of the municipality”).
92. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 378 (1996)
(discussing the unproductive battle to lure businesses with subsidies).
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municipalities often give up part of the property, sales, and income taxes
they would otherwise receive to lure businesses to relocate there.93
The reverse is true for the federal government. Between personal
income taxes (47%), corporate income taxes (11%), and payroll
taxes (33%), in 2015, 91% of federal government tax revenue came
from income.94 The multiplicity of exceptions and deductions in the
federal tax code makes it difficult to calculate a one-to-one
relationship between income and taxation. Nevertheless, federal
policymakers are extremely concerned (though not in agreement)
about the impact of various measures on income taxes.95
What is more, federal land use measures are more likely to have
foreseeable impacts on income than the classic use and area
restrictions enacted by local governments. One might (overstating it
quite a bit) even say this is a constitutional requirement. Under the
main provision authorizing federal land use restrictions, the activity
restricted must impact interstate commerce.96 And even though
Commerce Clause jurisprudence defines both “interstate” and
“commerce” broadly,97 the federal government is unlikely for political
reasons to intervene regarding land uses that do not have significant
monetary impacts. Consider some of the main federal land use
restrictions—New Deal Era agricultural adjustment programs;
Endangered Species Act habitat protections; Clean Water Act
restrictions on filling wetlands; Coastal Management Act regulation
of building on coastlines; and standards governing siting of airports,

93. See id. at 384–85 (reviewing tax incentives for businesses); Mark Taylor, Note,
A Proposal to Prohibit Industrial Relocation Subsidies, 72 TEX. L. REV. 669, 675–77 (1994)
(describing tax incentives to induce businesses to relocate).
94. Policy Basics: Where Do Federal Tax Revenues Come from?, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basicswhere-do-federal-tax-revenues-come-from.
95. See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX
REFORM IN THE 114TH CONGRESS:
AN OVERVIEW OF PROPOSALS 2 (2016),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43060.pdf (characterizing the ongoing income
tax debate as centered around reforming or repealing various tax expenditures).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
97. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012)
(discussing the “expansive” power over interstate commerce activities under the
Commerce Clause); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 236 (1948) (“[I]t is enough that the individual activity when multiplied into a
general practice . . . contains a threat to the interstate economy that requires
preventative regulation.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824) (stating that the
commerce power “is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the [C]onstitution”).
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telecommunications towers, and nuclear power facilities.98 All have
clear impacts on income, even if their magnitude and whether the
overall impact is positive or negative is subject to debate.
States will fall somewhere in between local and federal
governments in their sensitivity to income tax impacts. Individual
and corporate income taxes rose to make up about 28% of state and
local revenues in 2000.99 Greater reliance on property taxes in the
face of first rising housing prices, and then plummeting income,100
has reduced tax’s impact on revenue. However, income taxes still
comprise a significant portion of state revenues.101
Similarly, state planning measures fall somewhere between federal
and local ones with respect to the clarity of their impact on income.
In general, states have delegated their authority regarding land use to
municipal governments rather than exercising it directly.102 Many of
the state measures that do exist intervene to prevent local land use
restrictions that have undesirable statewide impacts, such as zoning
laws that exclude affordable housing103 or restrictions that prevent
construction of solar panels and other alternative energy sources.104
But others resemble federal measures that prohibit or encourage
broad changes to land use in ways that predictably affect income.105
Many of these are through programs mandated by or coordinated
with federal law, such as the Coastal Zone Management Act and

98. See generally Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the
Future, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 268–90 (2012) (summarizing federal measures
affecting land use); Todd A. Wildermuth, National Land Use Planning in America,
Briefly, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73, 73–79 (2005) (same).
99. Malm & Kant, supra note 81, tbl.2.
100. See Lutz et al., supra note 64, at 306 (discussing why property taxes remain
relatively stable in times of economic decline).
101. See Malm & Kant, supra note 81, tbl.2 (showing income taxes comprising 24%
of state and local tax revenue in 2010); STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE,
supra note 83, tbl.1 (showing income taxes as the same share of state and local tax
revenue in 2014 and 2015).
102. Salkin, supra note 98, at 257.
103. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2016) (permitting override of local
decisions barring affordable housing); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20–23
(LexisNexis 2016) (same).
104. See Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1242–44 (2009)
(discussing state laws that address land use restrictions that pose obstacles to
alternative energy).
105. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1424 (2012)
(discussing federal requirements that restrict the development of private property).
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Clean Water Act.106 Other programs with significant impacts on land
use, including regulations regarding fracking or public
transportation investments, are in part driven by their impact on
income and other tax revenue.107
C. Sales Taxes
Sales taxes are a very significant source of revenue for state
governments and sometimes a significant source of revenue for local
governments. Reliance on state and local sales taxation varies inversely
with other taxes. Restrictions on non-residential uses, big box stores,
shopping plazas, and the like obviously affect state and local sales taxes,
while restrictions on population density do so less directly.
Sales taxes comprise about a third of combined state and local
revenues.108 As the role of property taxes shrank over the course of
the twentieth century, the role of sales taxes grew, until sales taxes
comprised a slightly larger portion of state tax revenue.109 Since the
2008 recession, the importance of sales and property taxes has
flipped; in 2014 sales tax revenue was about 75% of property tax
revenue.110 Reliance on sales and income taxes are also often
inversely related—for example, Washington, which has no state
income tax, has one of the highest sales tax rates, while neighboring
Oregon has no general sales tax,111 but one of the highest income tax
rates in the nation.112
Local governments in thirty-eight states collect sales taxes.113 Such
taxes are particularly important in states with low property tax
106. Id. at 1424–34 (discussing various federal laws influencing state land use
decisions).
107. See, e.g., Press Release, State of Conn., Gov. Malloy:
Funding for
Transformative Transportation Plan Now Underway (July 28, 2015),
http://portal.ct.gov/Departments_and_Agencies/Office_of_the_Governor/Press_R
oom/Press_Releases/2015/072015/Gov__Malloy__Funding_for_Transformative_Transportation_Plan_Now_Unde
rway/ (“Improving transportation is fundamental to strong economic and market
growth.” (quoting Lieutenant Governor Nancy Wyman)).
108. Malm & Kant, supra note 81, fig.1.
109. Id. tbl.2.
110. STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE, supra note 83, tbl.1.
111. Scott Drenkard & Jared Walczak, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2015, TAX
FOUND. (Apr. 8, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-local-sales-taxrates-2015.
112. Jared Walczak, State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2015, TAX
FOUND. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-individual-incometax-rates-and-brackets-2015.
113. Drenkard & Walczak, supra note 111.
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collections. Alabama, for example, with some of the lowest property
tax collections,114 also has the highest average local sales taxes, and
one of the highest combined state-local sales tax rates.115 Similarly,
after California passed Proposition 13, which significantly limited
local property taxes, local officials shifted their development
planning toward attracting businesses that generated sales taxes.116 A
1999 survey of government officials in California found that they
ranked sales taxes as either the first or second most important factor
in considering new developments.117 Impacts on sales taxes are thus
an important land use factor for the large number of municipalities
with sales tax authority.
D. Conclusion
In general, governments will feel the positive or negative impact of land
use measures through tax revenues. Localities experience these impacts
significantly through property and often sales taxes and, less frequently,
through income taxes. Federal governments experience them directly
only through income tax revenues, but most federal land restrictions raise
obvious potential income effects. States will feel the effects of land use
restrictions on all three forms of taxation, although states have delegated
much of their land use authority to municipalities.
The tax feedback loop is not perfect. Tax deductions and
exemptions mean taxes often fail to capture the value of the asset
taxed, limit the accuracy of the signal, and add complexity to the
system, making it more difficult to perceive the relationship between
impacts on value and impacts on revenue. In addition, some
measures may increase the value taxed by one government but
decrease the value taxed by another. Imagine, for example, a local
government measure that prohibits commercial uses, which increases
property values and therefore local property taxes, but decreases sales
and therefore state sales taxes. However, this example is a failing of
compensation requirements as well because compensation is paid
only by one level of government, but the negative or positive impact
of that property restriction may be felt by another government
114. Malm & Kant, supra note 81, tbl.2 (showing Alabama as one of the five states
with the lowest reliance on property tax revenues).
115. Drenkard & Walczak, supra note 111 (listing Alabama with the highest local sales
tax rate in the country, and one of five highest combined local-state sales tax rates).
116. Jonathan Schwartz, Note, Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and
the Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 199–200 (1997).
117. Robert W. Wassmer, Fiscalisation of Land Use, Urban Growth Boundaries and
Non-Central Retail Sprawl in the Western United States, 39 URB. STUD. 1307, 1317 (2002).
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entirely. If the goal is to use fiscal incentives to get the government
to maximize wealth within a jurisdiction, the tax system is as close to
an accurate means to internalize costs and benefits as that
jurisdiction is going to get.
III. DO GOVERNMENTS CARE ABOUT REVENUE IMPACTS?
The preceding Section takes the cost-internalization argument on
its own terms, accepting its premises that policymakers actually care
about, and are motivated by, governmental revenues. As others have
written, there is good reason to believe that these premises are false.118
Maximizing governmental revenue is only tangentially related to most
political goals, and the structure of political decision making often
divorces those who make land use decisions from those who have to
pay for them. Nevertheless, enhancing revenues is a basic planning
goal, one that state and particularly local governments actively pursue.
Understanding the tax feedback loop also helps to explain why the
compensation requirements for regulatory restrictions enacted in
some jurisdictions have so effectively blocked such restrictions: even
when the action will produce more economic gains than losses, one-toone compensation is usually so much higher than the government’s
share of those gains that withdrawing the restriction is the only
rational choice. This Section discusses the extent of, and limitations
on, governmental sensitivity to financial incentives.
A. Governments Often Won’t Care Much About Tax Revenues
The fiscal illusionists’ assumption—that revenue impacts will
significantly impact political behavior—ignores both the theory and
reality of government decision making. A number of scholars have
examined these shortfalls.119 This Section briefly reviews the reasons
that governments often do not care about the revenue impacts of
land use restrictions.
First, it is a mistake to attribute the private actor’s desire to
maximize revenues to the self-interested political actor.

118. E.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 31 (1991).
119. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 38, at 279–80 (examining the political impact of
compensation); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent
Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 101 (2006) (discussing the ways that politics influence
eminent domain practice); Levinson, supra note 14, at 345–47 (arguing that
compensation requirements do not impact governments in the same way they impact
private firms).

BERGER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE ILLUSION OF FISCAL ILLUSION

10/31/2016 8:09 PM

29

Governmental representatives are not like pure economic actors,
whose interests are neatly aligned with the profits of their firms.
Public choice theory, the primary economic theory regarding
political decision making, posits that governmental actors are less
interested in maximizing governmental budgets than in maximizing
political power and securing reelection.120 Although beliefs about the
public interest clearly play a role as well,121 those who can most
powerfully express their sense of the public interest will have the
greatest influence on such beliefs. The most politically effective
actions in this light are not those that maximize benefit across a
broad group, but rather those that significantly affect a smaller group
of actors that is more highly motivated and can more easily
coordinate to act on its concerns, and which can therefore more
effectively command public attention.122 Daniel Farber has even
argued that, in some cases, failing to compensate may result in more
political pressure than will compensating because failure to
compensate will make owners more active in decrying their perceived
wrongs and make their cries more sympathetic to the public.123
In addition, policy-setting, implementation, and budget
management responsibilities are often divided among different
entities: sometimes within the same government, sometimes by the
same entity at different periods of time, and sometimes by different
entities—municipal, state, federal, or regional—altogether.124 The
people that cause revenue changes, in other words, may not be the same
people that experience the impact of those changes, limiting the effect
of such impacts on political behavior.125 Zoning and planning decisions,
for example, are made in the first instance by a planning commission,
then ratified by the general government, and then may be implemented
by a separate zoning board or board of adjustment.126 Neither the

120. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 118, at 20–22, 31; Levinson, supra note 14, at 374.
121. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 118, at 29–33 (arguing that politicians’
ideologies influence their actions).
122. Farber, supra note 38, at 289–90 (analyzing reasons that “small groups with
high stakes have a disproportionately great influence on the political process”).
123. Id. at 299; see also Brennan & Boyd, supra note 40, at 190 (calculating
compensation necessary to produce efficiency—generating political action).
124. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 119, at 141–42 (noting that local economic
development projects are often funded by state and federal governments).
125. Levinson, supra note 14, at 380 (explaining that the decision makers are
often bureaucrats rather than elected officials).
126. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, BETHANY R. BERGER, NESTOR M. DAVIDSON &
EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 429 (6th
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planning commission nor the board of adjustment, responsible
respectively for determining the rules and whether individual owners
comply with them, will be responsible for distributing funds between
schools, police, garbage collection, or the many other demands on
municipal revenues. A similar division of responsibility affects other
levels of government. Congress may enact a broad mandate, the
relevant agency will implement it, and a wholly different agency may feel
the revenue impact of the action.127 Revenue shortfalls, moreover, need
not block governmental action to the extent another government will
finance its operation at an own-revenue deficit.128
Even when the entities making, implementing, and paying for a
land use measure are closely aligned, the individual actors may not be
because there may be a lag time in realizing the costs and benefits of
a certain land use decision. A government official may leave office,
or face an election in which the official has to explain the decision,
long before the community or government realizes the tax benefits of
the decision. Nor will costs and benefits necessarily be realized on
the same schedule. A measure preventing development of wetlands,
for example, will immediately and significantly reduce the market
value of a parcel but only slowly produce economic benefits by
avoiding impacts on drinking water and avoiding costly protection
and remediation of areas subject to flooding. A decision maker’s
calculus, therefore, will rationally depend far more on the voices of
aggrieved homeowners and environmental advocates than the
promise of far off increased revenues. Indeed, that is perhaps how it
should be: as high as the economy is on the list of public concerns,
bean-counter kings are unlikely to create the kind of society in which
most of us want to live.
Again, all of these challenges may be levied equally powerfully at the
fiscal illusionists. Their arguments depend on the assumption that
making governments pay will cause governments to internalize costs and
make efficient decisions. This Section summarizes some of the many
reasons to doubt this assumption. The questions about whether requiring

ed. 2014) (describing the institutions involved in zoning code enactment and
implementation).
127. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4231 et seq., for
example, is implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency, but revenue
effects of compensation would be shared with those agencies, like Health and
Human Services or the Department of Defense, with large budgets that are
frequently subject to appropriations battles.
128. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 382 (stating that compensation may be paid
from a general fund rather than the budget of the agency deciding to take the action).
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compensation for land use decisions will lead to more efficient decisions
are thus another reason to question the fiscal illusion argument.
B. Sometimes Governments Do Care About Tax Revenues—But That’s Not
Always a Good Thing
While impacts on tax revenues are unlikely to be the primary
determinant of land use decisions, these impacts are an important
motivator, particularly for local governments. This Section discusses
both governmental sensitivity to revenue and its potential negative
consequences.
Local governments, which are most likely to make decisions
affecting land use, are also the most sensitive to the tax impacts of
their decisions. Part II suggested that because the connection
between taxes and land use measures is the most direct and
transparent for property taxes, local governments will be most
sensitive to the cost-internalization mechanism that taxes provide.
The political economy factors discussed above will work differently
for smaller local governments. Because municipal decisions are
readily capitalized into property values and property taxes,129
homeowners are far more aware and involved than either renters or
voters in federal, state, or large city governments.130 Officials in these
communities, therefore, are extremely responsive to “homevoter”
interests in maintaining overall community property values and
property tax burdens, and their decisions reflect this fact.131 Land use
plans from across the country cite increasing tax revenue and
reducing tax burden among their planning concerns,132 and
129. FISCHEL, HOMEOWNER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 39–40.
130. Id. at 4.
131. Id. at 89; cf. Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters
Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227, 229, 231–32 (2014)
(providing evidence that these values even impact land use decisions in New York
City, perhaps the polar opposite of the small municipalities Fischel focuses on).
132. See, e.g., HOKE COUNTY LAND USE PLAN, at I.3–4, A-32 (2005),
http://www.hokecounty.net/DocumentCenter/View/63 (noting that “land uses that
typically generate high tax values and collections but demand little in public services
are industrial and commercial activities” and that “[c]apturing sales tax revenue is
essential for guaranteeing a growing revenue stream for local government budgets”);
LAND USE PLAN: PLATTE COUNTY, MISSOURI, at 3–5 (2010), https://static1.squarespace
.com/static/564a1160e4b082647c602a40/t/566867f4df40f3a42f45b175/1449682932
498/2010_land_use_plan.pdf (discussing tax opportunities of increased retail sales);
LAND USE PLAN:
ROCK ISLAND COUNTY, ILLINOIS, at 6, 16, 24 (1998),
http://www.rockislandcounty.org/uploadedFiles/landuse98.pdf (discussing the
discrepancy between tax revenue and additional costs of new housing as impetus for
plan); MONTCO 2040: A SHARED VISION, THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR MONTGOMERY
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numerous studies demonstrate the connection between land use
patterns and hoped-for tax consequences.133
Sensitivity to revenue impacts does not necessarily lead to better
land use decisions. In fact, the small size that creates this sensitivity
also makes local governments less likely to fully internalize the costs
of their decisions because there is more spillover across municipal
borders.134 At times, spillover is deliberate. Governments may seek to
off-load a greater portion of the costs of their activity by, for example,
locating big box stores (with resultant traffic, aesthetic, and other
costs) or industrial activities (with environmental and stigmatic costs)
on municipal borders.135
At times, the spillover effects are
unintentional.
By downzoning or preventing new housing
developments, for example, municipalities may unintentionally

COUNTY, at 68 (2015), http://www.montcopa.org/DocumentCenter/View/7719
(discussing the need to “attract and retain businesses and vital community assets” to
provide “a strong tax base”).
133. See, e.g., JEFFREY I. CHAPMAN, PUB. POLICY INSTITUTE OF CAL., PROPOSITION 13:
SOME UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 11–12 (1998) (stating that Proposition 13 led
municipalities to compete for new big box stores and car dealerships); FUNDAMENTAL
PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra note 84, at 8 (claiming that increasing property taxes
without new revenues led New Jersey to overzone for commercial development and
underzone for housing); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Simple Analytics of
Land Value Taxation, in LAND VALUE TAXATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE 51,
67–68 (Richard F. Dye & Richard W. England eds., 2009) (finding that while property
taxes theoretically might increase or decrease sprawl, in practice the taxes’ effect is to
increase sprawl); Robert D. Cheren, Fracking Bans, Taxation, and Environmental Policy, 64
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1483 (2014) (showing that states without the authority to tax
fracking activity were far more likely to enact fracking bans); Wassmer, supra note 117,
at 1324 (showing the impact of sales tax reliance on non-urban retail sprawl); BENOY
JACOB & MICHAEL A. PAGANO, BORDER WARS: DO TAXES INFLUENCE LAND USE DECISIONS
ACROSS STATE BOUNDARIES? 17 (2009) (unpublished paper on file with author)
(demonstrating effects of property, sales, and income tax reliance on approval of
developments); see also Kurt Paulsen, The Effects of Land Development on Municipal
Finance, 29 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 20, 20–21 (2014) (stating that revenue and cost
modeling has become much more common in planning in recent years).
134. See ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS vii (1993) (discussing the
importance of spillover effects); Paulsen, supra note 133, at 26 (“Projections of likely
fiscal impacts for one community almost never consider the fiscal, land use, and
other indirect impacts on neighboring jurisdictions”).
135. See JACOB & PAGANO, supra note 133, at 10–11, 16, 30–31 (discussing the
spillover effect and noting its presence in retail development in Tempe, Arizona and
Kansas City, Kansas); Franco Ordonez, Neighbors Prefer Sweets to Power Plant: Doughnuts
Warehouse Considered, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 30, 2003, http://archive.boston.com/news/lo
cal/articles/2003/11/30/neighbors_prefer_sweets_to_power_plant (discussing a
decision to approve a power plant in a neighborhood near the Charles River).
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increase sprawl and undermine availability of affordable housing
across the region.136 Similarly, as multiple municipalities in a region
chase retail tax dollars, they may increase retail sprawl and decrease
open space for all.137
Of course, overall revenue is not the only goal motivating land use
decisions. The homevoter hypothesis means that homevoter wishes,
such as those for open space or against industrial uses, may hold sway
over revenue-maximizing land uses. Splashy but costly projects, such
as sports stadiums, may appear more attractive to politicians.
Municipal governments may also fail to accurately calculate either the
costs or revenues from new developments.138
For example,
municipalities across the country provide property tax rebates to lure
job-producing businesses even though, in the absence of local
income taxes, these businesses are unlikely to produce compensating
revenue for the municipality.139 As governments all use the same
techniques to lure businesses, moreover, the likelihood that the
business will be lured away before it creates surplus revenue
increases.140 Municipalities may also fail to account for competitive
effects within their own borders, such as the impact of big box
developments on the edge of town draining business and vitality from
the center of town.141
In short, although governments do at times take tax revenues into
account, this consideration often fails to result in land use decisions
that benefit either the local residents or the governments themselves.

136. See FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra note 84, at 1 (discussing the
ways that increased commercial zoning inadvertently decreases affordable housing).
137. See id. (finding that commercial zoning has led to a decrease in the
availability of green spaces).
138. See JACK R. HUDDLESTON, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, THE INTERSECTION
BETWEEN PLANNING AND THE MUNICIPAL BUDGET 1–2 (2005) (discussing a town that
pursued intensive downtown redevelopment to compensate for big box development
at the city’s edge, but found that the costs of maintaining the development
overwhelmed the city budget).
139. DAPHNE A. KENYON, ADAM H. LANGLEY & BETHANY P. PAQUIN, LINCOLN INST. OF
LAND POLICY, RETHINKING PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES FOR BUSINESS 2 (2012) (noting
that governments lose $5 to 10 billion dollars per year on property tax exemptions
despite a lack of evidence that they generate economic development).
140. Id.
141. Paulsen, supra note 133, at 33–34.
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C. Governments Do React to Full Compensation for Regulatory
Restrictions—And That’s Usually a Bad Thing
Although the tax feedback loop will not necessarily motivate
governments to enact fiscally and socially advantageous land use
measures, the full compensation response actually deters
governments from enacting such measures. Because, as discussed
above, full compensation to the owner is so different from and
usually so much greater than the benefits experienced by the
government, one-to-one compensation may deter even efficient
decisions.
Evidence from states that have required broad
compensation for losses caused by land use restrictions confirms this.
Full compensation requirements do not lead to more efficient
regulations; they simply shut regulation down.
The most extreme example comes from Oregon’s short-lived
Measure 37, which required governments to compensate owners
retroactively for losses in value due to land use restrictions enacted
after the owners acquired their land.142 In the three years before
Measure 37 was substantially modified in a second voter initiative,
owners filed over 7000 claims for compensation.143 In all but one
case, the responsible government simply waived the regulation rather
than compensate.144 The dominant explanation municipalities gave
for these decisions was that they lacked funds to pay compensation.145
For example, the Lincoln County Board of Commissioners repeatedly
justified its decisions by saying, “[T]he Board finds it is in the public
interest, due to the lack of resources to pay compensation, to modify,
remove or choose not to apply the challenged land use regulation to
the subject property and issue the ‘waiver’ to claimants.”146
The waivers, if not largely repealed by Measure 49, would have had
predictable negative consequences.147 Many of the building rights

142. See Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from the
Oregon Experiment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1287 (2009) (asserting that Measure 37
“fundamentally reworked governmental compensation requirements”).
143. Id. at 1284.
144. Id. at 1303.
145. Id. at 1307.
146. In re Ballot Measure 37 Claim of Walter and Sara Maguire, No. 06-LURCC-06,
Order No. 11-06-380, at 1, 2 (Bd. of Comm’rs for Lincoln Cty., Or., Nov. 8, 2006)
(approving a claim to divide property into up to eighty one-acre parcels); see also In re
Ballot Measure 37 Claim of Robert and Janice Foley, No. 147-LURCC-06, Order No.
9-07-708, at 1, 3 (Bd. of Comm’rs for Lincoln Cty., Or., Sept. 12, 2007) (approving a
claim to divide property into up to nine one-acre parcels).
147. Berger, supra note 142, at 1305.
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would have undermined state groundwater protections.148 Lane
County officials, for example, opined that the planned developments
could “imperil the quality of customers’ drinking water” in the county
by increasing levels of fecal bacteria and other contaminants.149 The
Oregon Department of Agriculture also found that Measure 37
development would have “major implications” for Oregon’s
multibillion dollar agricultural industry.150 But faced with the
disproportionate costs of paying the owners for the entire reduced
value of the owners’ land, from funds that the governments did not
have then and would likely not recoup, if at all, for many years, the
governments waived the restrictions.
Measure 37 was particularly extreme because it required
compensation for the effects of regulations enacted long before the
initiative came into effect.151 But laws with solely prospective effects
in Florida and Arizona also chill land use regulations. Florida’s Bert
J. Harris Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act (“Bert-Harris”),
enacted in 1995, requires compensation for land use restrictions that
“inordinately burden[]” property owners.152 Most of the planners
and government attorneys interviewed for a 2005 study reported that
Bert-Harris “fundamentally restricted their ability to do the[ir] job”
by giving individual owners power to freeze land use laws in place.153
As in Oregon, few governments chose to litigate under Bert-Harris.
Instead, most chose not to enact or to waive land use rules in the face
of Bert-Harris claims.154 For developers, meanwhile, threatening a
claim under the act became an easy way to circumvent legal obstacles
to their plans.155 By 2006, even Senator Harris, the sponsor who gave

148. Id. at 1306.
149. Id. (quoting Jeff Wright, Claims Spur Watershed Warning, REGISTER-GUARD
(Or.), Feb. 8, 2007, at A1).
150. Id. (quoting Oregon Dept. of Agriculture Develops Maps to Show Impact of Measure
37 Claims: Willamette Valley Farmland Faces Measure 37 Impact, OR. ASS’N OF NURSERIES
(Feb. 21, 2007), http://www.oan.org/?500#).
151. Id. at 1310.
152. Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, FLA. STAT. § 70.001
(2016).
153. George Charles Homsy, The Land Use Planning Impacts of Moving “Partial
Takings” from Political Theory to Legal Reality, 37 URB. LAW. 269, 288 (2005).
154. John D. Echeverria & Thekla Hansen-Young, The Track Record on Takings
Legislation: Lessons from Democracy’s Laboratories, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 459, 460–69
(2009).
155. Id. at 464.
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his name to the act, worried that the law may have become a
“development shelter.”156
Studies report a similar effect for Arizona’s Proposition 207 (“Prop
207”),157 enacted in 2006.158 In the wake of the act, municipalities
waived or failed to enact historic preservation, infill, and urban form
restrictions rather than expose residents to potentially ruinous suits
for damages.159 The law came too late to contribute much to the
massive sprawling construction before the Great Recession. Between
2005 and 2006 alone, 60,000 houses were built surrounding
Phoenix—and in the years afterward, those developments went empty
and new ones were not built.160 Today, however, massive new
leapfrog-style suburban developments are being planned in areas that
would be water-challenged even without current drought
conditions.161 Prop 207, however, “effectively eviscerated land-use
laws” that could slow growth.162
Whether the overall benefits of the unenacted or waived
regulations would have outweighed the costs is not clear. Most likely,
some would have and others would not.
But requiring full
156. Id. at 459.
157. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1134 (2016).
158. See, e.g., Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 154, at 522–24 (discussing
the way Proposition 207 undermined historic preservation); Jeffrey L. Sparks, Land
Use Regulation in Arizona After the Private Property Rights Protection Act, 51 ARIZ. L. REV.
211, 219–22 (2009) (reporting that Prop 207 had already chilled land use regulation
in Arizona); see also Kristena Hansen, Phoenix Grapples with Building Preservation amid
Legal Threats, PHX. BUS. J. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/prin
t-edition/2012/12/07/phoenix-grapples-with-building.html (quoting Mesa Mayor
Mark Smith’s statement that “there’s no doubt Prop. 207 has changed cities’
approach” to Phoenix’s 2012 attempt to protect a Frank Lloyd Wright home).
159. See Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 154, at 522–23; see also Sparks,
supra note 158, at 220–21; Infill Development: Completing the Community Fabric, MUN.
RES. & SERVS. CTR., http://mrsc.org/Home/Explore-Topics/Planning/DevelopmentTypes-and-Land-Uses/Infill-Development-Completing-the-Community-Fabric.aspx
(last updated Aug. 16, 2016).
160. Jonathan Thompson, Huge New “Communities” Planned for Tucson, Albuquerque:
Sprawl Rises from Its Slumber, but Urban Renaissance Is Still Thriving, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.hcn.org/articles/huge-new-communities-plannedfor-tucson-and-albuquerque-fringes.
161. See id. (describing the development within a “sizable swath of open desert
between Tucson’s urban fringe and the planned development”).
162. Jonathan Thompson, Light Rail Enters the West’s Most Sprawling Metropolis: New
Transportation Sparked a Renaissance in Denver. Can It Do the Same for Phoenix?, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.hcn.org/issues/46.20/two-cities-developpublic-transportation; see also City of Flagstaff, Student Housing Symposium (Oct. 27,
2014) (describing Prop 207 as “the largest impediment to local land-use regulation to
control student housing” because it makes down-zoning very expensive).
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compensation for the owners’ losses does not appear to lead to the
hoped-for careful balancing of potential costs and benefits. Instead,
it simply shuts it down. As discussed in Part I, this only makes sense:
the governmental revenue benefits, even of efficient regulations, are
almost always less than the cost of full compensation.163
D. Conclusion
Given the motivations and structure of governmental decision
making, balancing costs and benefits through the tax structure will
not necessarily affect land use decisions. When it does affect decision
making, moreover, the result may not be more efficient regulation of
land use. But lack of governmental responsiveness to fiscal incentives
presents a challenge not simply to the effectiveness of the tax
feedback loop; rather, it undermines the argument that costinternalization plays a helpful role in land use decisions at all. Full
compensation, moreover, distorts all consideration of costs and
benefits by imposing costs on the government that are so far beyond
what the government will likely realize, even for efficient regulations.
IV. SO WHAT?—OR, FOCUS ON FAIRNESS
Increasing overall efficiency in governmental land use decisions is
not the only, or even the most, important argument in favor of
compensation requirements.
The dominant justification for
compensation remains that it is required as a matter of fairness to the
individual owner. The argument that compensation is necessary to
align government costs and benefits, however, undermines careful
examination of the fairness justification. The apparent symmetry
between the compensation required to achieve efficiency and fairness
clouds separate interrogation of these objectives and the most
effective ways to achieve them. By showing that accurate cost
internalization does not require compensation, this Article allows
closer analysis of what compensation fairness does in fact require.
A. The Fairness Justification for Compensation
Fairness is a far older justification for compensation than efficiency
and remains judicially more influential. Justice Holmes distinguished
the fairness justification from the utilitarian justification in his 1922

163. See supra Part I (discussing the efficiency argument and explaining why
governments enact inefficient land-use regulations).
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opinion creating the regulatory taking.164 Regardless of the public
interest in the restriction, he stated, “the question at bottom is upon
whom the loss of the changes desired should fall.”165 The Court
formulated the problem more starkly in Armstrong v. United States,166
stating that the takings guarantee “was designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”167
The efficiency argument is far less prominent in takings
jurisprudence. A search of Supreme Court takings decisions turns up
none that use the term “fiscal illusion.” Only one Supreme Court
opinion uses the term “efficiency” to analyze a takings rule, and that
reference is in a dissent arguing against compensation for a
regulatory restriction.168 Justice Alito’s 2013 opinion in Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Management District169 invokes the insistence that
“landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct”
but only as a justification for the general rule upholding land use
restrictions against regulatory takings claims.170
It is of course true that the Court has long debated the effect of a
compensation requirement as a “check to the exercise of . . .
discretion by the legislature” and an incentive for investment in
property.171 But these debates have always been closely tied to
arguments about fairness to the individuals whose rights are claimed
to be lost.172 The fairness-efficiency link also appears in one of the
most explicit modern discussions of the efficiency justification for
compensation, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Pennell v. City of San Jose.173
164. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (stating that the public need
for the action does not itself justify not paying compensation).
165. Id. at 416.
166. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
167. Id. at 49. Since its drafting, this pithy phrase has been cited at least twentyseven times by the Supreme Court alone.
168. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1070 n.5 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that finding a taking in that case would have undermined
efficiency by creating a “moral hazard”).
169. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
170. Id. at 2595.
171. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 564 (1837) (McLean,
J., concurring) (stating that property owners would not invest to improve property if
they were likely to lose it to the government without compensation).
172. See id. at 566 (stating that the rights of “associations of men to accomplish
enterprises of importance to the public, and who have vested their funds on the
public faith, . . . do not become the sport of popular excitement, any more than the
rights of other citizens”).
173. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
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The Court there rejected as unripe a challenge that a limitation on
rent increases unconstitutionally took the property of the
landlords.174 Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the provision was
facially unconstitutional.175
One of Justice Scalia’s arguments was that if implemented, the
provision would permit the public to accomplish its goal of providing
housing for low-income people without having to acknowledge their
costs.176 This would result in both inefficient decisions and unfairness
to landlords:
The politically attractive feature of regulation is not that it
permits wealth transfers to be achieved that could not be achieved
otherwise; but rather that it permits them to be achieved “off
budget,” with relative invisibility and thus relative immunity from
normal democratic processes. . . . Subsidies for these groups may
well be a good idea, but because of the operation of the Takings
Clause our governmental system has required them to be applied,
in general, through the process of taxing and spending, where
both economic effects and competing priorities are more evident.
That fostering of an intelligent democratic process is one of the
happy effects of the constitutional prescription—perhaps
accidental, perhaps not. Its essence, however, is simply the
unfairness of making one citizen pay, in some fashion other than
taxes, to remedy a social problem that is none of his creation.177

If one equates the government’s fiscal gain to the owner’s loss from
land use restrictions, such links between fairness and efficiency seem
only logical. By revealing that the fiscal check on inefficient
regulations of land use exists independent of compensation to the
owner, however, we can more carefully interrogate what losses
property owners may demand as a matter of fairness alone.
174. Id. at 9–10.
175. Id. at 15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176. Id. at 22.
177. Id. at 22–23. Justice Scalia’s dissent inspired one state supreme court and
one Federal Court of Appeals opinion, although the first was a dissent and the
second was later vacated. Cf. Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Sup. Ct. of L.A., 968 P.2d
993, 1045 (Cal. 1999) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“As Justice Scalia’s dissent in Pennell
suggests, [when the costs of rent control] are paid by rental property owners through
government compulsion, however, it is impossible to measure the intensity of public
support for rent subsidies.”); Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1022 (9th
Cir. 2009) (Rent control takes “from A to give to B, both for the benefit of B (the
incumbent tenants) and for a larger group, who does not wish to support affordable
housing through more politic means”), vacated, 638 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not empower courts to impose sound
economic principles on political bodies.”).
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B. What Compensation Does Fairness Require?
Previous Sections discussed why compensation, even if potentially
useful to prevent over-taking of physical property, is not necessary to
prevent over-regulation: the government does not acquire the
property at all and loses tax revenue, revenue that will only be made
up by gains in taxation or decreases in services in other areas.178
Similarly, basic fairness would seem to demand compensation when
the government directly acquires the property or transfers it to
another, but this calculus shifts when the government simply
regulates how the owner uses the land.179
The reasons are already reflected in the case law. First, when an
owner is prevented from engaging in a use that is broadly agreed to
be harmful, justice does not usually demand that the owner be paid
to stop such use.180 There may be compelling justice claims when the
government, rather than preventing exploitation of a new use of
property, makes the owner stop a current use of the property.181 Even

178. See supra Section I.B.
179. Like the efficiency calculation discussed in note 27, supra, the justice
calculation is different in cases in which the regulatory restriction is the equivalent of
an easement for the government’s own use. This is evident in cases involving height
restrictions imposed on buildings in the flight path of airports, which are more
frequently found to be takings. See Griggs v. Allegheny Cty., 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962)
(finding the seizure of an air easement over the petitioner’s property was a taking).
In fact, the papers of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes suggest that Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the first Supreme Court case to find that a
regulatory restriction was a taking, was motivated by the sense that the restriction on
digging coal so as to cause subsidence was designed to protect the government’s own
streets and roads located above the coal mines. William Michael Treanor, Jam for
Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 859–60 (1998).
180. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013)
(“Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a
hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such regulations
against constitutional attack.”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
125 (1978) (stating that land-use regulations that promote the “health, safety, morals, or
general welfare” are typically upheld). Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council appeared to
reject the harm/benefit distinction but quickly resurrected it by saying that individuals
could not claim compensation if the action was prohibited by “background principles
of nuisance and property law.” 505 U.S. 1003, 1030–31 (1992).
181. The classic example is Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), in which
the Court rejected a takings claim by the owner of a brickyard whose operations were
prevented because a residential neighborhood had grown up around his existing
operation. See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the
Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1009–11 (1999) (arguing that compensation
should be provided in cases such as Hadacheck even though stopping operations was
the efficiency-producing result).
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here, compensation is often not required. As nuisance law has
recognized since candlemakers wafted their stench over Cotswold
cottages, in some cases the law must make a choice between one
owner’s use and another’s,182 and it usually need not pay the loser
when it does.183
Second, property only has value within a particular context, and
much of that context is created by governmental infrastructure and
surrounding properties that emerge from it. Regulatory takings
analysis therefore looks not just to the value an owner could realize if
the property could be used without a particular governmental
regulation but also to the owner’s “distinct investment-backed
expectations.”184 This inquiry requires attention to both whether the
opportunity the owner seeks to exploit is itself the product of
governmental regulation and the extent to which the owner has
already reasonably recouped the investment in the property.
Demands for compensation generally hold constant all
governmental inputs other than the impact of the restriction on the
property itself.185 But of course, governmental inputs into property
value are pervasive.186 Restrictions that apply to a range of properties
create a “scarcity effect[]” by limiting the properties that can violate
the restriction, thereby increasing the value of lifting the restriction on
any one property.187 Second, governmental actions—whether by
preventing the harm the restriction is intended to avoid, or by
independent provision of infrastructure or other “amenity effect[s]”—

182. See SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 106 (2d ed. 1890) (stating that medieval nuisance case against a
candlemaking factory was dismissed because, “Le utility del chose excusera le
noisomeness del stink”). Or, in Anglo-Norman legal “French,” the utility of the thing
excuses its noisome stink.
183. Whether the plaintiff came to the nuisance remains a factor in the analysis
but is no longer an absolute defense. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D
(AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating that the fact that the plaintiff came to the nuisance is a
factor but “is not in itself sufficient to bar his action”). Despite the academic
celebration of the purchased injunction of Spur Industries v. Webb, 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz.
1972), the ruling seems to have been a one-time remedy, tailored to the egregious
action of the developer. No other opinions use the phrase “purchased injunction,”
and I have been unable to find any references to such cases in the literature.
184. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
185. See Berger, supra note 142, at 1316.
186. For a fuller discussion, see Berger, supra note 142, at 1316–18 (discussing the
governmental inputs that often have an effect on property value).
187. William K. Jaeger, The Effects of Land-Use Regulations on Property Values, 36
ENVTL. L. 105, 106 (2006).
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increase the value of the location for all uses.188 Just as the government
does not claim precise payback for all incidental benefits to individual
property value, fairness rarely demands compensation when the
individual is the loser in the governmental action calculus.
Take, for example, the infamous office tower Penn Central
proposed to balance on Grand Central Station. With more than fifty
additional floors of office space in a midtown transportation hub,
Penn Central hoped eventually to net between 2 and 2.3 million
dollars per year on the addition.189 But this value was, even more
than for other New York real estate, inextricable from governmental
support and regulation.190
First, imagine that same piece of real estate on Manhattan Island
without the rest of New York City around it. The land would be
worth something, but not enough to justify building a fifty-story office
tower, or even a five-story one. For New York City to exist requires
the vast governmental resources that permit millions of people to live
and work together. Of course it would be wholly unjust to
compensate New York owners for property losses at the rate similar
properties would command in an undeveloped wilderness. But
imagine now, not Manhattan undeveloped, but Manhattan as it in
fact was in the 1970s when Penn Central was litigating its claim, with
the Bronx burning, garbage workers on strike,191 and New York City
itself preparing to file for bankruptcy.192 The office tower, had it
been built, would surely have suffered from the commercial real

188. Id.
189. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 116.
190. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (N.Y.
1977) (“It may be true that no property has economic value in the absence of the
society around it, but how much more true it is of a railroad terminal, set amid a
metropolitan population, and entirely dependent on a heavy traffic of travelers to
make it an economically feasible operation. Without people Grand Central would
never have been a successful railroad terminal, and without the terminal, a major
transportation center, the proposed building site would be much less desirable for an
office building.”), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
191. Kevin Baker, “Welcome to Fear City” – The Inside Story of New York’s Civil War, 40
Years on, GUARDIAN (May 18, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/may/
18/welcome-to-fear-city-the-inside-story-of-new-yorks-civil-war-40-years-on.
192. Ralph Blumenthal, Recalling New York at the Brink of Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 5, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/05/nyregion/recalling-new-yorkat-the-brink-of-bankruptcy.html.
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estate glut and bust at the beginning of the 1970s193 and benefitted
from government subsidization of the recovery.194
Even setting aside governmental contributions to these and other
developments, the value of the proposed office tower was always in
part a government creation. Grand Central was, after all, the New
York terminus of the interstate railroad system, which—from its
inception—was the product of government subsidies, eminent
domain, rights-of-way, and monopolies.195 New York City added to
these federal and state inputs by placing stations for multiple subway
lines under the terminal and bus lines beside it.196 The city further
subsidized the station by exempting it from most property taxes, a
benefit to Penn Central of over eleven million dollars in the previous
decade.197 In fact, the landmark preservation policy Penn Central
challenged was itself in service of something that Penn Central
depended on more than most businesses—keeping New York an
attractive destination for those from out-of-town.198 In sum, it was
almost entirely governmental action that made Grand Central
Terminal one of the most desirable commercial addresses in New
York. It was the height of chutzpah for Penn Central to claim that
the government had to pay because the company could not exploit
all of the economic potential that resulted from this government
action.199

193. See Vincent Mosco, The Empire at Ground Zero, in URBAN COMMUNICATION:
PRODUCTION, TEXT, CONTEXT 209 (Timothy A. Gibson & Mark Lowes eds., 2007)
(discussing New York’s office space glut and recovery).
194. See GEORGE J. LANKEVICH, NEW YORK CITY: A SHORT HISTORY 214–20 (2002)
(describing New York’s dire financial state in the 1970s and the programs
implemented for rehabilitation).
195. Penn Cent., 366 N.E.2d at 1276–77.
196. Id. at 1276.
197. Findings of Fact and Declarations of the Law of New York, Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York, Supreme Court, Trial Term (May 29, 1974),
reprinted in Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement, Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) at 53a.
198. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 366 N.E.2d at 1275 (describing Grand Central’s reliance
on out-of-town traffic). At that point, of course, the newly merged Penn Central
Company was no longer as interested in the declining railway business. The
company had sold off its air development rights in 1968—the same year it merged
with New York Central—which was one of several poor business decisions leading to
the company’s bankruptcy in 1970.
199. See id. at 1276 (“Plaintiffs may not now frustrate legitimate and important
social objectives by complaining, in essence, that government regulation deprives
them of a return on so much of the investment made not by private interests but by
the people of the city and State through their government.”).
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Delinking the cost internalization and justice aspects of a
regulatory takings claim may also permit more careful attention to the
investment in the specific opportunity the owner seeks to exploit.
Although return on investment is a well-established aspect of the
regulatory takings inquiry,200 demands for compensation rarely mention
the owner’s original investment in the property.201 To the extent this
information is available, often even with the restriction, the owner will
still profit after adjusting for inflation.202 Where the owner’s use now
undermines public interest, even in cases where the conflict was totally
unforeseeable, it is not clear that fairness demands more.
Take as an example the much-litigated wetlands and coastal
development restrictions. In many such cases, the restricted portion
of land was originally part of a larger purchase, but the owners had
developed and sold the upland portion long before the restriction’s
enactment.203 By the time the owners finally sought to develop the

200. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (“[T]he degree of interference with investment-backed expectations, is of
particular significance”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
136 (1978) (analyzing the regulation’s fiscal impact on the property); United States
v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903) (considering the property’s value in the Court’s
takings evaluation).
201. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (not discussing
original investment); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926)
(not providing original investment).
202. The Measure 37 campaign in Oregon, for example, was driven by ads
featuring Dorothy English, a grandmotherly woman, complaining that Oregon’s land
use laws prevented her from subdividing the land she had purchased with her
husband fifty years earlier. English and her husband, however, had already sold off
half of the original purchase decades before, netting about ten times the original
price for the land. At the time she made the ads, moreover, her remaining property
was worth 150 times what she and her husband had paid for the whole parcel, or
twenty-one times in time-adjusted dollars. Berger, supra note 142, at 1321. This is a
considerably better return than she would have gotten had the same investment
received a compounding 10% interest rate for a similar time. See Compound Interest
Calculator, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://investor.gov/tools/calculators/compou
nd-interest-calculator (last visited Oct. 19, 2016). Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), is a notorious exception. David Lucas allegedly
purchased his two lots for almost one million dollars before South Carolina
established that he could not build on the lots. Id. at 1006–07. However, Lucas’
purchase at top-of-the-market prices for two parcels from the partnership he had
recently left seems to require more explanation. See Vicki Been, Lucas v. the Green
Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY
STORIES 299, 304–06 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009)
(speculating that the purchase price may have been set to reap tax benefits).
203. See, e.g., Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1288–90 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (setting forth that the plaintiff bought 2750 acres of coastal property, sold
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wetlands portion, intervening legislation prevented the change.204 It
seems likely that at the inception of the purchases, draining and
filling the land would not have been economically worthwhile, but
the value of the easy-to-develop parcels made the investment
profitable even without doing so. Only after other nearby land had
been developed—often with government-financed water, sewer, and
transportation infrastructure; subsidized flood insurance; and
emergency assistance after natural disasters—would it be sufficiently
profitable to develop the last remaining land. At this point, even the
restrictions on wetlands development would enhance the property’s
value to the plaintiffs, effectively creating a monopoly in the area.
Only a very peculiar sense of fairness would decree compensation for
owners because they could not profit from this monopoly.205
This Section is obviously not a comprehensive or conclusive
examination of whether and what degree of compensation is fair for
regulatory restrictions. Rather, this Section argues that the linkage of
fairness-based compensation and efficiency-based compensation may
have distorted the analysis of each, individually. Understanding that
economic costs are already balanced—at least as well as they can be—
through the tax system may allow more thoroughgoing examination
of the fairness question. This examination should place less
emphasis on an isolated analysis of the value of the land with and
without the restriction, and more on what other factors created that
value as well as on whether the owner has already recouped any
investment justice demands the owner reap from the land.

or developed the vast majority, and did not consider developing the 4.99 acres at
issue until 2002); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1377–78
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (setting forth that the plaintiffs originally purchased 311 acres, sold
the 260 upland acres, received permits to fill the remaining acres in 1961, but
allowed the permits to expire and did not again seek to develop the area until 1988);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(involving plaintiffs who purchased a 250-acre tract in 1956, developed upland 199
acres, and did not seek to develop the remainder until 1970s); Palazzolo v. State, 746
A.2d 707, 709–10 (R.I. 2000) (concerning a plaintiff and partner who originally
developed only the small upland portion of the land, and only much later sought to
develop the portion that would need dredging and fill).
204. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 28 F.3d at 1173–74 (referencing the impact of the
Clean Water Act legislation, passed in 1972, which regulated development near
bodies of water).
205. Despite this, the Federal Circuit recently found that only the impact on the
undeveloped fraction of land should be considered in such a claim. Lost Tree, 707
F.3d at 1294–95.

BERGER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

46

10/31/2016 8:09 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

C. Regulatory Takings and Murr v. Wisconsin
All of these considerations are relevant to Murr v. Wisconsin, the
regulatory takings case pending in the Supreme Court.206
The case involves two neighboring lots on the St. Croix River,
purchased by the petitioners’ parents in 1960 and 1963.207 The
parents built a vacation cabin on the first lot and left the second
undeveloped.208 In 1994 and 1995 they transferred the first and then
the second lot to their children, both times without compensation.209
In 2004, over four decades after the original purchases, the children
became interested in selling the undeveloped lot.210 They then were
allegedly “flabbergasted” to learn that they could not build on the
lot.211 In 1975, the County amended its zoning ordinances to comply
with federal and state laws designating the St. Croix River as a “part of
the National Wild and Scenic River System,”212 as well as to prevent
erosion, water contamination and flooding, and to protect property
values.213 The ordinances required that a lot include at least one acre
of buildable area before construction on the bluffs would be
permitted.214 Because the lots are located on an extreme slope and
also subject to wetlands and right-of-way restrictions, the buildable
area of the undeveloped parcel is only 0.5 acres, and the buildable
area of the developed parcel is 0.48 acres.215 The 1975 restriction,
however, has an exception that permits building a single family
residence on lots of less than one acre created before 1976.216
Because, however, the Murrs own both lots, and there is already a
residence on the combined lots, their property does not qualify for

206. 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016), granting cert. in Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014
WL 7271581 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014) (per curiam).
207. Murr, 2014 WL 7271581, at *1.
208. Id.
209. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 15-214, 2015 WL
4932231, at *4 (2015).
210. Id. at *4.
211. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 5, Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 15-214, 2016 WL
1459199, at 1, 5 (2016).
212. Brief for Respondent St. Croix County at 4, Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 15-214,
2016 WL 3254214, at 1, 5 (2016).
213. Id. at 7–8.
214. Id. at 8; St. Croix Cty., Wis., Land Use & Dev. Ord. § 17.36.G.1.b (July 1, 2005).
215. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 209, at *5 n.1.
216. See id. at *5 (explaining that landowners may build on “any lot created prior
to January 1, 1976 . . . but only if the lot ‘is in separate ownership from abutting
lands’”).
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the exception.217 The Murrs petitioned the Supreme Court to
determine that the undeveloped parcel should be considered
separately for regulatory takings analysis.218
Compensation should not have been needed to make the
municipality internalize the economic costs of the restriction.
Because Wisconsin is among one of the most property-tax dependent
states in the union,219 St. Croix County should already have
internalized the effects of its restricting more extensive development
in this vacation community through lost tax revenue. The Murrs’
case, however, reveals the flaws in tax assessments as a reflection of
value. Until the dispute began, the assessment did not reflect the
zoning restriction, and the lots were assessed as individual buildable
lots.220 Once the dispute began, however, the Murrs challenged the
assessment, and the lots are now being taxed as a single buildable
lot.221 The County is now (albeit belatedly) internalizing the
economic cost of the restriction.
The fairness considerations discussed above also weigh against
compensation. First, the value the Murrs hope to exploit is at least in
part the result of governmental action. By prohibiting building on
lots with less than one buildable acre of land, the County limited the
supply of buildable land in St. Croix and surely raised the price of
land that could still be developed.222 By restricting the number of
new residents to the community, moreover, the restriction likely
prevented growth in demand for taxpayer funded services and
thereby reduced the tax burden on existing residents. And the
wetlands and slope preservation restrictions that limited the buildable
portion of existing parcels likely helped to preserve St. Croix River
County as a peaceful community on the water.
Even if the value the Murrs claim to have lost could be separated
from their gains from the governmental action, they have no
investment-backed expectations that must be compensated to achieve

217. Id.
218. Id. at *9, *22.
219. Forster & Padgitt, supra note 50, at 2 (listing Wisconsin as one of the ten most
property-dependent states).
220. Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 212, at 32 n.13.
221. Id.
222. See Brief of Carlisle Ford Runge et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 15-214, 2016 WL 3398639, at 1, 2–3 (2016)
(explaining how property value may be increased “by restricting the amount of
development that can occur in an area”).
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justice. First, the petitioners themselves obtained both lots for free.223
While the ability to give property to one’s children is precious, and
one should not diminish property rights simply because they came as
a gift, the lots here still have substantial value.224 There hardly seems
to be a compelling justice claim because the gift is not worth quite as
much as the recipients hoped.
Most importantly, for more than forty years, the petitioners and
their parents were happy to use the property in exactly the way in
which they can still use it, as land surrounding their vacation residence.
The Murrs treated the lot as part of their larger property, using it for
swimming, camping, and parking, even building a volleyball court
there.225 Indeed, the additional buildable area and river frontage
secured by combining the two lots enhances their value to such a
degree that they would only be worth 10% more if developed
separately.226 Fairness does not demand payment simply because the
Murrs cannot now exploit part of their property in violation of the
public calculation about the needs of their community.
CONCLUSION
The assertion that compensation will correct fiscal illusion in
governmental land restrictions rests on mistaken premises. The
argument treats the revenue gained by governments the same as the
loss to owners that results from the restrictions. This assumption is
wrong. Governments generally only experience revenue increases
through tax benefits, which are by design a small fraction of the value
experienced by society as a whole. What is more, governments also
experience lost revenue, again through the tax system, from
restrictions that reduce the value of land and the income it produces.
Revealing this mistake leads to three important conclusions. First,
requiring full compensation for regulatory restrictions is not
necessary to cause governments to internalize the costs of their
actions. The tax system already does this. Inefficient land use
measures—those whose costs outweigh their benefits—will lead to a
decrease in government revenues, and efficient ones—those whose

223. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 209, at *4.
224. See Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 212, at 18–19 (noting
that the property was worth $698,000 sold as a single lot).
225. Id. at 13.
226. See id. at 18–19 n.12 (noting that the trial court found that the combined lots
with a single home would be worth $698,000, while the two lots sold separately each
with a home would be worth $771,000).
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benefits outweigh their costs—will lead to an increase in government
revenues or at least reduced demands on such revenues. The
qualifications to this equation are discussed above, but overall, the tax
system already is a far more accurate way to ensure that governments
feel the economic impact of their actions than is full compensation.
Second, full compensation will only distort government efforts to
enact efficient land use policies. Because the cost of full compensation
far outweighs the revenue benefits even of efficient regulations,
governments will rationally choose not to enact regulations that would
be socially beneficial.
Evidence from states that require full
compensation for losses due to land use restrictions bears this out.
Third, revealing that full compensation is not necessary to
achieve—and in fact undermines—efficiency allows more careful
analysis of the fairness justification for compensation. In particular,
full compensation shifts attention from the reduction in dollar value
due to the restriction in isolation, to the portion of that value the
owner should be able to demand from the government. Under this
analysis, compensation will often not be required because the
governmental restrictions are in fact what makes property valuable to
begin with, and because the value remaining with the owner is more
than sufficient to satisfy justice.
Determining when regulatory restrictions should result in owner
compensation is a wilderness of competing ideological concerns and
real world effects. This Article is not the magic path out of that
wilderness. It seeks only to clear some of the underbrush obscuring
the way. Doing so, it is hoped, will facilitate progress toward just and
beneficial regulation of land.

